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Remnant Gifts Over in Kentucky
By W. L.

UNDmE

MAT-EWS, JR.*

LAW theory of estates in property, future, nonpossessory ownership may be created in one person concurrently
with present, possessory ownership in another. Both interest
holders are owners in the sense that both have a definable estate
in the property that fixes their rights and remedies in relation to
each other and in relation to third persons. Neither is an absolute
owner of the property, however, in any full or practical sense if
absolute ownership is taken to mean an exclusive unconditional
right to do with the property as one sees fit. The very essence of
the theory is the fact that ownership may be concurrent and
divided while possession remains exclusively with only one of
the owners. Moreover, common law dogma provides a very
rigid formula for valid creation of present and future interests.
The estates known to the law are few in number, no new estates
may be created, and the nature of the present interest is primarily
determinative of the nature of the future interest coupled with
it. Unless the rules and principles designed to maintain the integrity of the formula are followed in creating concurrent but
divided ownership, the intent of the grantor or testator may not
be legally effective. And even if his expressed intent is allowed
to prevail where it fails to conform conceptually, the instrument
inevitably presents a difficult construction question when it comes
to be interpreted by a court.
Remnant gifts over nearly always create the kind of construction problem just described. They appear most often in homemade wills where the testator, unaware of legal theory, attempts
to preserve eventual ownership of family assets in .his children
or other relatives without denying his widow an unlimited right
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to do with the property as she pleases. Usually the instrument
fails to designate technically the kind of present estate or future
estate intended and also fails to say expressly whether the first
taker shall have the right to make testamentary disposition of the
property, a criterion frequently used by the courts to determine
if the present interest is a fee simple estate. Since testator's
expressed intent is supposed to govern interpretation of his will
and since he simply ignores well-entrenched legal principles governing valid creation of present and future estates, the uncertainty
of his meaning is actually intensified by the clarity of his words.
The most difficult construction problem occurs, therefore, where
the will provides in general, unequivocal language that the first
taker shall have the property to use, consume or dispose of as he
sees fit, but if any portion remains at his death, it shall go to
designated persons over. This, in fact, is the typical remnant gift
provision with which many courts have struggled, trying to
reconcile what testator says with what the law permits.,
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has shown ingenuity in interpreting remnant gift provisions, especially since its 1948 decision
in Hanks v. McDanel, 2 but has not decided categorically whether
the gift over can take effect as a remnant future interest even
though fee ownership is conferred on the first taker. Under the
common law formula for rationalizing the nature of the gift over
as a future interest, this question lies at the heart of the interpretation problem. It must be answered before sound, predictable
construction of such provisions can be made and before the legal
draftsman who is called on to express remnant gift intention can
hope to do so with safety. Part I of this article describes existing
law inhibiting creation of a remnant future interest after a fee,
traces briefly the origin of these rules and suggests a basis for
permitting such an estate to exist. Part II evaluates some of the
more important recent Kentucky cases interpreting remnant gift
provisions.
1 By far the most complete compilation of cases involving a remnant gift
over appears in 17 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1950). This 227 page Annotation exhaustively

treats all phases of the problem and surely cites all of the important American and
English decisions decided prior to 1950. The total number of decided cases and
the wealth of judicial opinion on particular points of construction are good
evidence of the very real difficulty the courts have experienced in interpreting
remnant gifts over.
2 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W. 2d 784 (1948).
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I

Although of feudal origin, the common law theory of estates
in property (referred to herein from time to time as the common
law formula, admittedly a deceptive phrase) remains the law today in substantially unmodified form. Certain basic principles,

which all lawyers trained in the common law take for granted,
form the bedrock of the theory and give it its rigid character.
Only those that affect the validity of a remnant gift over need be

mentioned here. First, no new estates unknown to the law may
be created merely through an expression of intention, although
conditions may be imposed on the known estates, and although
control of the ownership of property may be conferred by creating
a power rather than an estate. 3 Second, the known estates, either
present or future, achieve their basic nature or character primarily
because of the way in which they are created rather than from

the proprietary rights which the law attributes to the particular
estate.
As a general proposition, the first principle is seldom violated
in its application in the cases, but the second seemingly is distorted with some frequency where the court concludes that a particular estate exists because of the proprietary right conferred
rather than the form or method of its creation.4 The fact remains,
3 A clear concise summary of the principal characteristics of the common law
theory is given by Professor Simes in the introductory chapter of his three volume
treatise. 1 Sn ms, LAW OF FUTrUE INTmrwdrs, Secs. 1-35 (1936) (cited hereafter
as Simes). In Section 35 of this chapter Simes points out that in the 17th and
18th centuries the fixed character of the common law estates had developed to
the point where it was inconceivable that a person could limit new interests according to his own whim. He aptly illustrates this fundamental feature of the
common law doctrine by saying, "When an interest was created, it was forced
into one of these categories like sardines in a tin, and made to fit." Sec. 35 at
p. 41; In the balance of the cited section the mitigating effect of the common law
condition is fully explained. Thus it was quite clear to the common law logician,
such as Coke, that the rigidity of estate types could be largely circumvented by
the imposition of special limitations or conditions subsequent in great variety.
The notion remained, however, that a given interest in land had all the legal
characteristics of the estate in the particular category to which it was assigned
even when a limitation or condition bad been imposed on it. See also Johnson v.
Whiton, 159 Mass. 424, 34 N.E. 542 (1893) where Mr. Justice Holmes declared,
on the authority of Lord Coke, that "a man cannot create a new kind of inheritance."
4 As discussed more fully infra at p. 411, perhaps the best illustration of this
sort of "distortion" is where the court concludes that the present interest is
necessarily a fee because the first taker has been given the right to make testamentary disposition. The extreme example of this kind of digression from strict
common law doctrine is where a few courts have historically classified a life
estate coupled with a general power of appointment as a fee simple. See for
instance: Gibson v. Gibson, 213 Mich. 31, 181 N.W. 41, (1921); Van Deventer
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however, that both principles have a direct and vital bearing on
the validity of the creator's intent: the first because it confines
him to the known concepts in conferring rights of ownership and
the second because it requires him to invoke the known concepts
through traditional form and expression in creating the estate if
he intends to avoid difficulty in the interpretation of his instrument. Thus the beginning law student learns to his amazement
that even in the Twentieth Century one who desires to convey
or create present, possessory ownership in freehold must create a
fee simple or a life estate (or in a few jurisdictions a fee tail),'
and one who intends to confer future, nonpossessory ownership
can only do this by creating a remainder, an executory interest,
or a reversionary interest.' He learns further that the different
kinds of future estates cannot be coupled together with any kind
of present interest. Thus if the present interest is a life estate (or
where permitted, a fee tail), the future interest by definition is a
remainder or a reversion depending on whether it is given to a
third person or retained by the creator.7 But if the present interest
is a fee simple, the future interest in a third person is necessarily
an executory interest.8 Without elaborating the ramifications of
the common law formula beyond this oversimplified description,
one can begin to see how the uninformed testator entraps himself
by giving clear expression to remnant gift intention.
Under the formula, the gift over must take effect either as a
remainder or as an executory interest. The nature of the future
interest depends on the nature of the present interest: if the first
taker has a fee simple, the donee over can only have an executory
interest, but if the present interest is a life estate, the gift over
necessarily is a remainder. If proper classification of the future
interest were merely a matter of terminology, the courts might
v. McMullen, 157
120, 101 S.E. 62
(1927). 2 Snmss,
pudiated either by

Tenn. 571, 11 S.W. 2d 867 (1928); Steffey v. King, 126 Va.
(1919); Ogden v. Maxwell, 104 W. Va. 553, 140 S.E. 554
Sec. 598 concludes that all of these cases have now been restatute or later court decision.
51 AmmCAN LAW oF PROPERTY, See. 1.42 (1952); 1 RESTATEMENT, PRopERTY 201 (1936); 1 SnES, See. 87 (1936).
61 A3,mcAN LAw OF PROPERTY, See. 4.5 (1952); 1 Smms Sec. 39 (1936);
the term reversionary interest is used here to include the reversion, the possibility
of reverter and the right of reentry or power of termination. This is the terminology of the Restatement and is used frequently to avoid repetitious enumeration. See 1 RESTATENENT, PROPERTY, Secs. 154, 155 (1936).

71 SnEs, See. 39 (1936).
8 Ibid.
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easily graft an exception on to the traditional theory and give
effect to the testamentary intent apart from minor distortion in
labels. But the nature of the gift over as a future interest is more
fundamental to solution of the construction problem than the
question of what it should be called. A remainder after a present
fee is invalid because the former has been considered repugnant

to the latter since feudal times.

Moreover, many courts deny

validity to an executory interest following a fee if it is conditioned
on failure of the first taker to dispose of the property. 10 Such condition is the sine qua non of a remnant gift over. From the prac-

tical viewpoint, therefore, existing law denies validity to the only
two kinds of future interests available under traditional estate
doctrine for giving effect to remnant gift intention. This then is
the underlying and often unrealized construction dilemma created
by a testamentary provision for remnant gift over: shall legal
doctrine be modified to permit creation of a strange future interest or one that is traditionally invalid, or shall testator's intent

be made to conform through interpretation or implication?
On the whole, American courts have taken the second approach. They consistently hold the gift over void if testator in-

tends to confer absolute ownership on the first taker in the
form of a fee simple estate."

This result is manifestly unsatis-

9 Harder v. Matthews, 309 Ill.
548, 141 N.E. 442 (1923); Blackstone describes the repugnancy of fee and remainder in these terms: "no remainder can
be limited after the grant of an estate in fee simple: (b) because a fee simple is
the highest and largest estate that a subject is capable of enjoying; and he that
is tenant in fee bath in him the whole of the estate; a remainder therefore which
is only a portion or residuary part, of the estate, cannot be reserved after the
whole is disposed of." 2 BLAcKSToNE's CoiaENTsuEs 164; the classical treatment of the origins of the remainder and its repugnancy to a fee is in 2 PoLLocK
AND MAmAL
n, HISToRY OF ENGLISH LAw (2d Ed.) 21 et seq. (1911).
10
The earliest American decision on the point probably was Ide v. Ide, 5
Mass. 500 (1809) although the opinion of Chancellor Kent some ten years later
in Jackson v. Robins, 16 Johns (N.Y.) 537 (1818) is frequently described as the
origin of the doctrine. The great number of decisions which support the general
proposition that a valid executory interest cannot be conditioned on disposal by
the first taker are assembled in Sections 5, 9 and 14 of the A.L.R. Annotation,
supra ,note 1. For a particularly clear and categorical assertion of the principle
see: Galligan v. McDonald, 200 Mass. 299, 86 N.E. 304 (1908); Parker v.
Powledge, 198 Ala. 172, 78 So. 483 (1916); Sayre v. Kimble, 93 N.J. Eq. 30,
114 A. 744 (1921); Starkan v. Ziska, 406 Ill.
259, 94 N.E. 2d 185 (1950).
11 Combs v. Combs, 172 Ark. 1073, 291 S.W. 818 (1927); Bradford v.
Martin, 199 Iowa 250, 201 N.W. 574 (1925); Re Wadsworth, 176 Minn. 445, 223
N.W. 783 (1929); Peyton v. Smith, 213 N.C. 155, 195 S.E. 379 (1938); Whitehead v. Whitehead, 174 Va. 379, 6 S.E. 2d 624 (1940); Pirtle v. Kirkpatrick, 297
K. 785, 181 S.W. 2d 425 (1944); Bennett v. Bennett, 193 Misc. 553, 81 N.Y.S.
2d653 (1948).
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factory because it fails completely to achieve the expressed testamentary intent. If testator intends to give the first taker a life
estate only, the gift over is sustained as a valid remainder in fee,
but the life estate is supplemented with an express or implied
power to use, consume or dispose.' 2 This construction is unnecessarily awkward and usually requires substantial distortion of the
explicit wording of the instrument. Apart from this, however, the
question inevitably arises whether the power is limited or unlimited, both as to testamentary disposition and as to testator's
intended criteria for exercise of the power. Although this interpretation solves the validity of the gift over, it opens up a
Pandora's box of litigable construction questions about the power
and requires the court to foresee all of the exigencies of family
need and desire which may trigger its legal exercise. 13 Of equal
consequence to the legal draftsman is the high premium this approach places on thorough familiarity with the latest specific
utterances of the court concerning the scope of such powers. In
fact, only a cursory examination of the cases will show that few
draftsmen and no unadvised testators can anticipate how the
power coupled with the life estate will be interpreted. The only
certainty seems to be that every remnant gift provision involving
disposition of property of sufficient value to warrant suit must be
litigated.
It is surprising to find so little judicial attention given to the
alternative approach of re-examining and modifying legal doctrine. In looking for a way out of the construction dilemma, it
12 Otis V. Otis, 104 Kan. 88, 177 P. 520 (1919); Keiser v. Jensen, 373 III.
184, 25 N.E. 2d 819 (1940) (overruling Sweet v. Arnold, 322 Ill. 597, 153 N.E.
746 [1926] requiring the power to consume to be express); Hanks v. McDanell,
307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W. 2d 784 (1948); Glidewell v. Glidewell, 360 Mo. 713, 230
S.W. 2d 752 (1950); Collings v. Collings' Ex'rs., 260 S.W. 2d 935 (Ky. 1954)
commented on 42 Ky. L.J. 717 (1954).
13 Professor Ralph Norvell has described these exigencies in great detail and
with considerable imagination: Norvell, The Power to Consume: Estate Plan or
Estate Confusion, 28 MIcH. STATE B.J. 5 (1949). The writer concludes this
article by pointing out "The only policy argument which su pports the toleration
of a device (life estate coupled with power to consume) which is so likely to lead
to confusion and wasteful litigation lies in the idea that every owner should be
allowed to dispose of his property in the manner he chooses so long as no
affirmative rule of law is violated. Perhaps this gives to the owner of the small
estate, which cannot support a more elaborate settlement, a claim upon the legal
system to provide for him a method (albeit beset with some uncertainty) by
which he may provide financial security to the immediate objects of his bounty
and yet control the devolution of title through the maximum period allowed by
the law."
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would seem logical to rationalize the remnant gift over as a
remnant future estate designed to become possessory if the first
taker does not exercise his fee ownership by disposing of the property. As already pointed out, the historical repugnancy of a remainder after a present fee and the traditional invalidity of an
executory interest conditioned on failure of the fee owner to dispose are the related bits of classical learning that bar this path.
Because of their amazing vitality in our legal lore, they cannot be
ignored or changed summarily; they must be examined and
evaluated to see if they are immutable or serve any useful modem
purpose.
The incompatibility of a present fee and a remainder rests on
the notion that a fee simple absolute is the maximum estate of
ownership known to the law. The remainder developed at common law as a future interest designed to become possessory after
a present estate less than a fee. The classic example is "to A for
life, then to B in fee." B, the remainderman, is entitled to possession when the preceding estate of limited duration "expires."' 4
Since a fee is an estate of unlimited duration and never expires
of its own terms, once it is created there are no rights of ownership-no future estate-to be conferred over by way of remainder.
Although the repugnancy of fee and remainder may be thought
of as an historical anachronism which places form above substance, there is no real prospect that common law estate theory
will be modernized soon to permit creation of a "remnant remainder" after a present fee. To do so would require too severe
a change in the classical concept of a fee.
The repugnancy of fee and remainder never existed historically between a fee and an executory interest. In contrast to the
remainder, an executoy interest is designed to vest and become
possessory in derogation of a fee,' 5 and its creation is thoroughly
compatible with absolute (but non-exclusive) ownership in the
first taker. The classic example is "to A in fee, but if A die without issue, to B in fee." The difference between the two types of
future interests historically was more than a matter of form, however. The remainder originated in the early common law as a
legal future interest subject to the various prohibitions at law
14 1 Sams, Sec. 51, p. 78 (1936).

15 Id., See. 154, p. 275.
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against transfer of seizin in futuro while the executory interest
originated as a springing or shifting equitable use and could not
be created as a legal future estate until after the Statute of Uses.1"
Although contingent by nature, the executory interest was not
subject to the common law rule requiring timely vesting of con7
tingent remainders, either before or after the Statute of Uses.1
Because of the fundamental difference between the remainder
and the executory interest traceable to their different origin, no
inherent characteristic of the modern executory interest prevents
its use for remnant gift purposes. In fact, it probably is just the
kind of future interest testator would intend to create if he were
informed technically about such matters. In most cases, if his
expressed intention has any technical meaning at all, he intends
to create fee ownership in the first taker followed by fee ownership in the donee over, contingent on first taker not fully exercising his ownership by consuming or disposing of the property.
Unless an executory interest so conditioned is invalid because it
violates some basic legal policy, this clearly is the best rationalization of the remnant gift over because it requires no change whatever in common law or modem theory of future estates.
The traditional invalidity of a remnant executory interest
seems not to rest on policy considerations primarily, although
such a future interest is referred to in some cases as inconsistent
with present fee ownership.' Rather it is traceable to the influence of a very questionable decision by Chancellor Kent in lackson v. Robins 9 at the beginning of the 19th century. In striking
down an executory interest conditioned on failure of the fee owner
to dispose, Kent relied on Pells v. Brown 0 the famous 17th century decision of the King's Bench establishing the "indestructibility" of executory interests. Kent reasoned that if an executory
interest was indestructible it could not exist subject to any condition permitting the fee owner to destroy it. Thus if the first taker
had unlimited power to dispose of the property in fee and could
prevent the executory interest from vesting by exercising this
Id., Sec. 149, p. 268.
Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Reprint 504 (1620); 1 Sams,
Secs. 97-98, p. 164 et seq. (1936).
18 Van Horn v. Campbell, 100 N.Y. 287, 3 N.E. 316 (1885); Clay v.
Chenault, 108 Ky. 77, 55 S.W. 729 (1920); 3 Sams, Sec. 595, p. 526 (1936).
19 16 Johns (N.Y.) 537 (1818).
20 Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Reprint 504 (1620).
16
7
1

RmANT GIrs OVER

right, the gift over was necessarily void; otherwise it would be
destructible at the hands of the first taker.
Kent's view of the scope of the doctrine of indestructibility
and his application of it to the remnant gift over would have been
meaningless to the King's Bench at the time of Fells v. Brown.
In that case the English Court simply held that an executory
interest, although contingent, could not be destroyed by common
recovery since it was not subject to the rule that a contingent
remainder must vest at or before the expiration of the preceding
freehold estate. In other words, since an executory interest is
preceded by a fee estate of unlimited duration which cannot be
terminated prematurely by tortious conveyance or merger, it was
not destructible at common law in the way a contingent remainder could be destroyed. In this sense and this sense only,
Fells v. Brown classified the executory interest as indestructible
and preserved it from attack at a time when the destruction of
contingent remainders was common practice. In no sense does
Fells v. Brown stand for the general proposition that any executory interest is void where the owner of the fee has power to
prevent it from vesting by performance of a condition.
Professor Simes has made perhaps the clearest explanation of
the misconception implicit in Kent's application of Fells v. Brown
to the remnant executory interest. He points out:
... the fallacy in Kent's argument is in the use of the word
'destructible' to mean two different things. What Pels v.
Brown meant was that an executory interest could not be
defeated by common recovery and the intent of the testator
thus frustrated. But an executory devise after an absolute
gift to the first taker, coupled with power of disposal, is not
destructible in that sense. It is destructible in the sense that
if the
according to testator's intent, it may fail to take 2effect
1
power is exercised because testator so provided.
Simes' point that testator actually intends for the remnant
executory interest to be destroyed if the owner of the fee exercises his right to dispose is most important because this is the
precise point which many courts have ignored in following Kent's
dictum blindly. They seem unaware that any executory interest
may not take effect in the sense that it will fail to vest and become
213

Sams, See. 595 at p. 525 (1936).
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possessory if the condition precedent on which it is created fails
to occur. By generalizing Kent's misconception into a rule of law,
such cases hold in effect that testator cannot select the first taker's
failure to dispose as a valid condition precedent. No sound or
historical reason exists why any future interest should be void
merely because the contingency is controlled by the owner of
the present estate, and normally one may impose any condition
precedent he chooses, provided of course the rule against perpetuities is not violated. Thus a remainder or an executory interest contingent on failure of the possessory owner to have issue,
to remain unmarried or to pay money is perfectly valid.
Apart from the influence of Kent's dictum there is little traditional objection to a remnant gift taking effect as an executory
interest except perhaps a deep-seated feeling that all remnant
gifts over are inconsistent with full ownership in the first taker
regardless of the kind of future interest created. It is said sometimes that a gift over after a fee denies one of the principal attributes of fee ownership to the first taker-the right to dispose of
the property in fee; and other reasons for voiding the gift are
offered occasionally.22 In final analysis all the reasons are merely
variations on the theme of repugnancy. As already shown, this
doctrine at best is an historical anachronism applicable only to
the remainder after a present fee. It never existed in any true
conceptual sense between the fee and the executory interest and
should not be extended or perpetuated where it is unnecessary to
maintain the integrity of sound future interest definitions.
Unless a court is prepared to hold as a matter of law that a
testator cannot alter the traditional scheme for ultimate devolution of title to his property by creating a remnant executory
interest, the only problem raised by the typical remnant gift over
is whether the will shows adequate intent to create the proper
22 Professor Simes summarizes the various reasons given by the Courts as
follows:
"... (a) According to the argument suggested in Guilliver v. Vaux, the gift
over is bad because by no possibility could the heir take, not by will because one
cannot devise to his heir, not by descent, because, were the gift over valid, it
would take effect on intestacy to defeat the heir; (b) as to personalty, the gift
over is bad because it is too indefinite; (c) the gift over is badbecause executory
devises are necessarily indestructible by any act of the holder of the preceding
estate; (d) the gift over is repugnant to the prior absolute gift; (e) the gift over
deprives the fee simple estate in land or absolute interest in personalty of one of
its necessary incidents, namely, that it will pass to heirs or personal representatives
on intestacy." 3 Sams, Sec. 595, p. 523 (1936).
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kind of future interest. In these terms, t~stator's intention is unenforceable only if he purports to create a remnant gift in the
form of a contingent remainder after a present fee. Since he
seldom if ever specifically identifies the nature of the gift over as
a future interest, his whole will can be interpreted without distortion of its plain meaning to create a remnant executory interest
conditioned on failure of the first taker to dispose.
The main advantages of this rationalization for the remnant
gift over are at least two. First, it permits the express, literal
intent of the testator to have maximum legal effect without any
violation to traditional or logical application of common law
estate theory. Second, and more important, it eliminates the most
perplexing phase of the construction problem by making it unnecessary to speculate whether testator intended to create a fee
or a life estate in the first taker. The intent to create a present fee
may be conceded without jeopardizing the validity of the gift
over. This in turn reduces the need for implying a power of disposal in the first taker as life tenant and minimizes, but does not
eliminate entirely, implications concerning the scope of first
taker's right to dispose of the property.
When viewed in the manner suggested, the legal consequences
of remnant gift intention are soundly explained. The first taker
has full (but not exclusive) ownership in the form of a possessory
fee simple subject to an executory interest over contingent on
the first taker failing to consume or dispose of the property, either
inter vivos or by will. Under this kind of "ownership" the first
taker has full right to use and possess the property during his
life time without liability to the donee over, and he can transfer
the property in fee simple free of the executory interest. If
testator does not intend to confer unlimited right to use or dispose, his language can be construed accordingly and the executory interest will vest when the terms of the condition are met.
Pending disposal in fee or consumption of the property through
use, the donee over, as owner of the executory interest, has a
right to future possession of the property which he will realize on
if the first taker does not consume it or dispose of it. His future
interest is alienable and devisable and should he die intestate
before the first taker dies, it will descend according to the laws
of descent and distribution like any other contingent future in-
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terest. Moreover, it would not be a sound argument to contend
that the holder of the remnant executory interest really has no
interest or estate of value unless there is certainty his future
ownership will become possessory. Modern theories of future
ownership have long since developed to a point where it is quite
clear that one may have a valid, valuable, existing right to future
possession that may never become possessory either because the
condition precedent to its vesting never occurs or because the
property itself is not in existence when possession materializes.
Finally, there could be no question about the validity of the
remnant executory interest under the rule against perpetuities
since the contingency must occur within the life of the first taker,
a life in being at the time the interest is created.
In all probability the legal consequences described are precisely those testator would have intended had he been aware of
the conceptual and construction questions raised by the language
used in his will. This alone should be ample reason for judicial
recognition of the suggested rationalization since the courts are
properly committed to the notion that clear and unequivocal
testamentary intent must prevail unless it contravenes some immutable policy in the law.
II
The Kentucky Court treats the validity of a remnant gift over
as a matter of construing the will and this probably accounts for
its failure to express any clear view concerning the validity of a
remnant executory interest contingent on first taker failing to
dispose. In all of the modern cases the court has attempted to
solve the construction problem on the assumption that any gift
over after a fee is invalid. This approach, as already suggested,
makes the meaning of the instrument most difficult to reconcile
not only because of the inconsistencies within the will but because it is virtually impossible to apply well established principles
of construction to varying language in each will with reasonable
consistency.
Three broad rules of construction have been relied on in the
cases, however, and seem to serve as the court's frame of reference in most cases. First, the decisions repeatedly assert that the
intent of testator governs in a remnant gift will as in all other
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testamentary interpretations.2 3 If taken too literally, this maxim
is not very helpful since it really amounts only to an explanation
for the conclusion reached after other construction principles are
applied. Apparently in no instance has the court followed the
rule so literally as to uphold a remnant gift over without regard
for the law or the way in which the intention is expressed. Looking to the intent of the testator is simply a main guide post that
permits the court to give effect to what it thinks the testator
intended, based on what he said or did not say in his will, and
based also on the intent any testator might have expressed had
he anticipated the legal question in issue. When understood in
this light, the rule serves a very useful purpose in interpreting
remnant gifts because it enables the court to justify a conclusion
that testator intended to create the proper kind of present and
future interest. This reduces to some extent the inherent conflict
between the express wording of the will and existing legal doctrine.
Second, Kentucky decisions since 1948 have established the
firm construction principle that testamentary intent in a remnant
gift will must be derived from the instrument as a whole. 24
Before the decision in Hanks v. McDanell' this "polar star" rule
had been applied to all wills except those purporting to create a
gift over after a fee. The latter had been governed by the "biting
rule," a principle quaint in logic as well as name.26 This rule
rested on the assumption that primary intent always is expressed
in prior provisions of the will. Thus if testator conferred fee
23 Greenway v. White, 196 Ky. 745, 246 S.W. 137 (1922); Phelps v. Stoner's
Adm'r., 184 Ky. 466, 212 S.W. 423 (1919); Watkins v. Bennett, 170 Ky. 464, 186
S.W.2 182 (1916).
4Wiglesworth v. Smith, 311 Ky. 366, 224 S.W. 2d 117 (1949); Swango v.
Swango's Adm'r., 313 Ky. 495, 232 S.W. 2d 347 (1950); Hall v. Hall, 314 Ky.
733, 237 S.W. 2d 55 (1951); Collings v. Collings' Ex'rs., 260 S.W. 2d 935 (Ky.
1953); St. Joseph Hospital v. Dwertman, 268 S.W. 2d 646 (Ky. 1954); 40 Ky.
L.J. 350 (1952); 42 Ky. L.J. 717 (1954). Even prior to 1948 the Court of
Appeals had taken notice of the fact that adherence to the old rule had in given
cases defeated the intent of the maker of the will. See the candid opinion in
Berner v. Luckett, 299 Ky. 744, 186 S.W. 2d 905, 906 (1945).
25907 Ky. 243, 210 S.W. 2d 784 (1948).
26 A full history and description of the biting rule and its application is given
in the opinion in the Hanks case. The history of the rule also is elaborately
described in United States v. 711.4 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situate in
Clinton and Russell Counties, Kentucky, 107 F. Supp. 62 (W.D. Ky. 1952). For
comparatively recent but pre-1948 decisions applying the historical rule, see:
Piftle v. Kirkpatrick, 297 Ky. 785, 181 S.W. 2d 425 (1944); Wells v. Jennell,
232 Ky. 92, 22 S.W. 2d 414 (1929); Jackson v. Ku Klux Klan, 231 Ky. 370, 21
S.W. 2d 477 (1929).
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ownership on the first taker in a prior part of the will, he could
not reduce this interest to less than a fee by providing for a
seemingly inconsistent gift over in a later part of the instrument.
Although simple to apply, this test ignored the fact that separate
parts of a will are frequently inconsistent in fact and also that
no logical reason exists for preferring one clause over the other
merely because it is written first.
Under the modem rule or the historical rule, attention is
focused on the estate testator intends to create in the first taker,
but the effect of the rules on the validity of the gift over is strikingly different. Under the biting rule the nature of the present
estate is governed entirely by the words appearing in the clause
that creates it. In most cases this will insure the invalidity of the
gift over since the clause creating the present interest usually is
worded so broadly as to point to a fee. If the intent is derived
from the whole instrument, however, the subsequent provision
for gift over is an important factor in determining whether the
prior clause creates a fee. As will be seen, this factor may not be
decisive, but the fact that it can be considered at all is an important step in seeking the "actual" intent of testator. Although
the rule of the Hanks case is infinitely harder to apply, it does
supply much-needed leeway in reconciling literal testamentary
language with known legal principles. In one sense it widens the
area of conflict by bringing to bear all that testator said, but it
also widens the base for expression of legally effective intent and
creates need for more specific principles of construction designed
to make sense out of the whole instrument. Potentially it frees
the court from the necessary implication under the biting rule
that any gift over after a fee is inherently repugnant to absolute
ownership in the first taker.
A third general construction principle is used in remnant gift
cases although it obviously is of different rank from those already
discussed. The Kentucky court has held repeatedly that an absolute fee is bestowed on the present owner when he is given
an unlimited right to dispose broad enough to include testamentary disposition27 In other words, as a matter of construction
27 Collings v. Collings' Ex'rs., 260 S.W. 2d 935 (Ky. 1953); Berner v. Luckett,
299 Ky. 744, 186 S.W. 2d 905 (1945); Pirtle v. Kirkpatrick, 297 Ky. 785, 181
S.W. 2d 425 (1944); Wells v. Jennell, 232 Ky. 92, 22 S.W. 2d 414 (1929);
Sisson v. Sisson, 208 Ky. 843, 272 S.W. 15 (1925).
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the right to dispose in fee by will is the ultimate criterion of the
nature of the first taker's estate. This in turn governs the validity
of the remnant gift over since it cannot follow a fee. However
logical this view may seem to be when standing alone, it requires
the conclusion, under existing law, that a gift over following a
present interest is invalid where the owner of the present estate
has the right to dispose of the property in fee by will. The conclusion like the premise seems to ignore the fact that the testator
may have intended actually to give the first taker a fee simple
subject to a remnant executory conditioned on failure of the first
taker to dispose either inter vivos or by will. Fortunately the
Kentucky Court in its most recent decisions has applied the rule
negatively. They have used it as a basis for implying from the
particular wording of the will that testator did not intend to give
first taker a right of testamentary disposal. To attribute this
meaning to what he said prevents his gift over intention from
taking effect. Therefore, as the Court inferred very clearly in
Collings v. Collings' Ex'or.,28 the gift over shows that testator did
not intend for the first taker to have unlimited right to dispose of
the property. In fact the Collings case seems to restrict the scope
of the power even though it is exercised before death and this
position has been reaffirmed in St. Joseph Hospital v. Dwertman
where the Court identified the first taker's interest as "a consuming life estate."29 Suffice it to say at this point, the Kentucky cases
are committed to the proposition that one who has the right to
control devolution of title by will owns in fee.
In so far as the creation of a fee is a question of construction,
the Kentucky rule is a major departure from strict common law
theory. Historically the only emphasis was on magic words of
limitation used to denote the duration of the estate. Thus a fee
simple estate could be created only where the conveyance or
devise was "to A and his heirs" and a life estate arose only if the
transfer was "to A for life." Without these meaningful words no
estate of any known character was created; conversely, the
nature of the estate and the extent of right thereunder were fixed
by their use. Since the nature of the estate fixed the scope of
the right, any alteration in the traditional proprietary power
28 260 S.W. 2d 935, 937 (Ky. 1953).

29268 S.W. 2d 646, 648 (Ky. 1954).
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commensurate with the estate was achieved by imposing conditions on it or by subjecting it to the exercise of a power. These
conditions and powers, however broad in scope, did not alter the
nature of the estate; they merely existed in all their dignity as
appendages to the feudal estates.
Much of the particular doctrine just summarized has lost its
vigor in modem application, and properly so, but not all of it has
been discarded. Specific words of limitation are no longer
necessary to create a fee simple estate 0 and it is generally recognized that the kind of estate created should depend on the incidents or attributes of ownership conferred. On the other hand,
the historical notion that the nature of one's ownership is not
changed by imposing a condition on the estate or subjecting it
to a power remains unchanged. Thus a fee simple estate to exist
so long as the property is used for a particular purpose is a
determinable fee and confers full proprietary rights until breach
of the condition. 3 ' Similarly, a life tenant who has a general
power to appoint the property in fee is still a life tenant in the
sense that his life estate can be followed by a future interest, a
future estate, incidentally, that is universally classified as vested
rather than contingent. 2 This feature of modern estate theory is
most important in construing remnant gift provisions because it
explains legally how testator may intend to confer fee ownership
on the first taker, including the right to dispose in fee by will, and
still intend to confer eventual ownership over on the happening of
a stated condition or event: failure of the first taker to dispose.
Thus whether the validity of a remnant gift over is determined
as a matter of law or as a matter of construction, the vital question remains: is there any legal policy to prevent valid creation
of a remnant executory interest following a fee conditioned on
failure of the fee owner to dispose? Translated into the construction context of the Kentucky cases, the question becomes: although the first taker has a fee if he has a right to make testamentary disposition, does it necessarily follow that a gift over
so0I AmcN LAW, OF PRoPERTY, Secs. 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, pp.8 o9
(1952). The text in the sections cited is very completely documented bothtas to
the historical rule requiring use of the word "heirs" and as to the modem
statutory and case law on the point in each of the forty-eight states.
31Id., Sec. 2.6, 94; PESTAT.EMENT, PROPERTY, Sees. 44, 49 (1936).
32 1 SIMxS, Sec. 80, 134.
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conditioned on failure to so dispose cannot take effect as a
remnant executory interest? Except for the authority based on
Kent's dictum discussed earlier, 33 sound application of strict common law theory requires a negative answer to this question. The
only difficulty in Kentucky is that the Court of Appeals has failed
to consider the question directly, and much of what it has written
and decided in the more important cases seems to reflect the
view that a remnant gift over cannot follow a fee. In fact, the
absence of direct and unequivocal authority on the point suggests that the Court's position is retrievable. It may be helpful,
therefore, to evaluate the important Kentucky cases decided since
1948 from this viewpoint.
Beginning with the Hanks case in 1948, the Kentucky Court
has decided nine comparatively recent cases that are of significant
importance in determining the validity of remnant gift provisions. Although the gift over was sustained in six of these
cases, 35 it is quite clear in all but one of them36 that this decision
was reached on the theory that a remnant gift provision reduces
the first taker's interest to a life estate. The gift over was construed to be void in two of the other three cases, but not for
reasons germane to the thesis of this discussion. In one, the particular will became operative before the new rule of construction
37
established in the Hanks case was supposed to become effective.
In the other case, the gift over was provided for in precatory language and the Court correctly held that it was unenforceable,
See discussion supra, p. 404 et. seq.
Sparks, Future Interests, 1954 Annual Survey of American Law, 655 at
662; But see: 42 Ky. L.J. 717, 723 (1954).
35 Hanks v. McDanell, 307 Ky. 248, 210 S.W. 2d 784 (1948). Noted 40 Ky.
L.J. 850 (1952); Jacobs v. Barnard, 307 Ky. 321, 210 S.W. 2d 972 (1948); Hall
v. Hall, 314 Ky. 783, 287 S.W. 2d 55 (1951); Weakley v. Wealdey, 287 S.W. 2d
524 (Ky. 1951); Collings v. Collings Ex'rs., 260 S.W. 2d 935 (Ky. 1953); St.
36 Hospital, Lexington v. Dwertman, 268 S.W. 2d 646 (Ky. 1954).
Joseph
Hall v. Hall, 314 Ky. 733, 237 S.W. 2d 55 (1951).
33
34

37 Stewart v. Morris, 313 Ky. 424, 231 S.W. 2d 70 (1950). The opinion in
this case admits that the Court mistakenly applied its new rule of construction
retroactively in both the Banks case and the Jacobs case, decided in the same
term, since both wills became effective before the actual date of the Hanks
opinion which was intended to be of prospective effect only. The particular
problem was settled conclusively in the Stewart opinion which stated expressly
that no will should be governed by the Hanks case unless the testator died after
April 23, 1948, the precise date of the Hanks opinion. Interestingly enough the
suggestion has not been made in any case that the Hanks rule should govern
only those wills written after the above date. Apparently the testator is presumed
to know what the law will be at his death and cannot rely absolutely on rules of
construction in force when the will is written.
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although the opinion seems to suggest that the provision would
have been valid if it had been mandatory. One case, not included in the six or two already mentioned, sustained the gift
over where the testator had indirectly identified the present interest as a life estate, but the effect of these words was minimized
in construing the whole will. 9
When viewed as a whole these cases are direct precedent for
the conclusion that a remnant gift over will be sustained as a remainder in Kentucky even if the will does not expressly identify
the first taker's interest as a life estate. But they are at best only
indirect evidence as to whether the Kentucky Court would sustain a gift over after a fee on the grounds that a clearly intended
remnant executory interest is valid. It is necessary, therefore, to
examine the opinions in these cases to see if the Court has committed itself on this point through meaningful dictum.
The Hanks opinion itself is of little help on the precise point
because the Court was concerned almost entirely with abandonment of the biting rule as the applicable rule of construction.
The Hanks will gave testatofs residuary estate to his wife:
...
to be used, enjoyed and disposed of by her in any
way she may choose with this provision however-that
should any of said property... remain at the death of my
said wife, the same shall be divided equally among Mallie
Bledsoe,40 Louisa Hanks, John W. McDanell and Flora
Wooley.

The Court enforced the gift over and held that the "polar star"
rule should govern the construction of clearly expressed remnant
gift intention unless it antagonizes a statute or is against public
policy. No effort was made to define the use of the term public
policy except in the context of the immediate problem. Apparently this immediate context was whether the biting rule of
construction itself reflected a public policy against enforcing the
gift over as a remainder after a life estate. The point is expressed
as follows in the opinion:
To first vest one with a fee title, but in the same
conveying instrument manifest an intent and purpose to
38
Swango v. Swango's Adm'r., 313 Ky. 495, 232 S.W. 2d 347 (1950).
39
Wiglesworth v. Smith, 311 Ky. 366, 224 S.W. 2d 177 (1949).
40307 Ky. 243, 244, 210 S.W. 2d 784, 785 (1948).
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limit it to a life estate (even with power to encroach upon
the corpus of the property) and then direct that if the first
taker should die without appropriating for his personal
benefit the entire property, the remnant thereof should go
is not forbidden by any definition of public
to others
4
policy. 1
If this language means what it says literally, the Hanks
opinion stands only for the proposition that a remnant gift over
is valid if it can take effect as a remainder after a life estate
through construction of the will as a whole. If the difference
between a remainder and an executory interest were merely a
matter of form, one might argue with some confidence that the
expression of view in the Hanks opinion is broad enough to mean
that creation of a remnant executory interest is not against public
policy. But as already demonstrated, the remainder and executory interest are fundamentally different in nature, in form, in
origin and in historical treatment by the courts. Especially are
they different as to the kind of present interest that can precede
them and this is most important in assessing the Kentucky view,
because as will be seen, the Court of Appeals has repeatedly
refused to hold that the life tenant can have an unlimited, implied power to dispose in fee either inter vivos or by will without
invalidating the gift over. Unless the first taker as life tenant has
such power, his consuming life estate is in no sense the equivalent
of fee ownership. It is, therefore, no mere matter of form to say
that a gift over which takes effect as an executory interest after a
fee is different from a gift over that takes effect as a remainder
after a life estate coupled with a limited power to consume or
dispose. The policy as to the latter is crystal clear while the
policy as to the former is unrevealed. In essence this is all that
can be said about Kentucky law based on the Hanks case, and
this conclusion is the crux of the remnant gift problem. The
testator in the Hanks will used language broad enough to suggest he intended his wife to have unlimited power of disposal,
even by will, and that he intended the gift over to become effective only if this power was not exercised. By changing the traditional rule of construction and by slightly "rewriting" the will so
it created a life estate coupled with a limited power of disposal,
41Id. at 247, 210 S.W. 2d at 786. (Emphasis supplied).
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the Court gave effect to the gift over But was full legal effect
given to all the testator's expressed intent? Can the intent underlying the Hanks will and expressed in it in unequivocal terms be
given full legal effect without enforcing the gift over as a remnant
executory interest?
Little is added to the picture by the opinions in Jacobs v.
Barnard4 and Stewart v. Morris.4 The former case, decided in
the same term as Hanks, merely adopted the Hanks opinion,
while the latter decision relates only to the prospective effect of
Hanks already mentioned.4

Wiglesworth v. Smith,45 decided a year after Hanks, gives
some additional insight on the problem although the will creating
the remnant gift indirectly identified the first taker's interest as
a life estate. The will gave residue to testator's wife during her
lifetime "with the right to use any or all of the same if in her
opinion it may be necessary for her support and maintenance." 4
A subsequent provision bequeathed and devised any remainder
to named persons "if at the death of my wife she has not used and
expended all of my estate." This clause of the will also contained
the following assertion:
It is to be understood that this item is to be no restraint
on my wife's use of my property but just in the event any
remains at her death I make this provision because of the
donees over) have shown tokindness and care they (the
47
ward my wife and myself.
The wife eventually decided that she needed to sell the principal
assets of the estate, a sixty-two acre tract and a two acre tract of
land, because the income therefrom was insufficient for her
maintenance and support. She contracted to sell in fee, but the
vendee refused to perform on the theory that she did not have
power to sell without court approval. The Court sustained her
right to convey in fee and required the vendee to perform, but
not directly on the ground that she had an express life estate
coupled with an express power to convey infee. Rather they re42307

Ky. 321, 210 S.W. 2d 972 (1948).

43813 Ky. 424, 231 S.W. 2d 70 (1950).
44 See discussion, supra, p. 413, especially note 37.
45311 Ky. 366, 224 S.W. 2d 177 (1949).
46311 Ky.
47 Ibid.

at 367, 224 S.W. 2d at 177. (Emphasis supplied).
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lied on the Hanks case and from a reading of the whole will concluded:
it was the testator's intention that his widow
should possess all the powers as to the use and appropriation of the real estate devised to her the same as that of an
absolute fee owner with the exception possibly that she
dispose of the property by giving it away, or by
could not
48
...

will.

Again the Court leaves the critical question untouched. Would
the gift over have been valid if the testator had without question
intended to confer right of disposition through inter vivos gift and
by will? Except for the equivocal and suggestive wording of the
opinion, there is little in the case to point toward this conclusion.
The quoted wording of the opinion may be slightly more indicative of a friendly attitude toward a remnant executory interest
than anything in the Hanks case, but it falls short of a well considered statement of legal principle.
In some ways Swango v. Swango's Admrrr.49 is the most interesting of the cases under consideration. Here testator gave all
of his property to his wife "for her absolute use and benefit."
He said expressly: "I want her to use the above to suit herself, to
sell, trade or barter, or spend as she sees fit."50 Following these
provisions, he wrote "After my wife's death I desire the real and
personal property, money if any, that may be left to be divided
equally between my wife's and my heirs." Except for the precatory word "desire" appearing in the gift over clause, this was
the perfect instrument to test the legality of the remnant executory interest. The express intent, both as to the nature of the
present interest and the condition on which the gift over was
created, could not have been clearer. Moreover, the wife had in
fact exercised testamentary power over the remaining estate at
her death and the issue in litigation was between her devisees and
the donees over. The Court avoided the potential question and
confined its construction problem to the legal effect of the particular word, desire, concluding it was not mandatory. On this
ground they correctly decided that the gift over provision did not
impair the first taker's fee. One statement in the Swango case
48311 Ky. at 371, 224 S.W. 2d at 179. (Emphasis supplied).
49 313 Ky. 495, 232 S.W. 2d 347 (1950).

50 313 Ky. at 496, 232 S.W. 2d at 347.
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is most revealing as to the Court's view of the Hanks decision.
The Court said:
While this Court has repudiated the rule that
where an absolute estate is devised, subsequent provisions
will not be held to impairthat estate, we still must seek out
the true intention of the testator.51
Framing the Hanks rule as a rule relating to the impairment of
the fee might suggest that the remnant gift over must impair the
fee if it is to be valid. In this sense, the Swango opinion seems to
confirm the idea that there is no policy against remnant gifts
provided they can take effect as a remainder and provided further
that the will as a whole is susceptible of an interpretation which
permits this conclusion.
The Swango opinion ends with a remarkable bit of dictum
that leaves the evaluation just made in doubt. The final paragraph asserts:
Reading the entire will, it is clear to us that the testator
intended no legal or enforceable limitation on the estate
left to his wife, except possibly in the event she died without having disposed of a portion of it. Since she had, by
use and by will, appropriated it all, there
was no remaining
52
estate in which appellants could share.
Without intending to dance on the head of a pin, what could this
dictum possibly mean, except that the remnant gift might have
been enforceable if the first taker had died without having fully
exercised her fee ownership. The final sentence quoted seems to
say also that the remnant gift failed to take effect merely because
there was no property left undisposed of. This is quite a different
thing indeed from failing to give effect to a remnant gift over
because it is precatory or because it would have to be sustained
as an executory interest. If this closing remark in the Swango
opinion is read out of context, it comes precious close to saying
that a mandatory remnant gift over is enforceable even though
the first taker has a fee which entitles her to dispose by will. This
is, of course, too precarious a basis on which to classify the
opinion. The Court probably was not conceptualizing the problem as it is conceptualized here when the particular words were
51 Id. at 497, 282 S.W. 2d at 348.
52Tbid. (Emphasis added).
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written. And nothing else in the opinion suggests that the Court
intended to expand the doctrine of the Hanks case. Thus when
read in context the particular statement probably stands only
for the fact that the Court was considering all possible interpretations of the instrument in the process of arriving at its final construction. Even on this basis, the Swango case is of value because
it shows that the executory interest relationalization might get
due consideration if properly presented to the Court as a method
for resolving the construction dilemma inherent in all remnant
gift wills.
Perhaps the most difficult Kentucky case to classify is Hall v.
Hall decided in 1951. 53 Here the will was homemade and simply
provided:
This is my will. I am in good health and sound
mind. I want my wife Lena R. Hall if she is the longest
liver to have all my belongings and at her death if my
brothers Bert Hall and Tom Hall are still living it can be
divided between the two families, and if Lena R. Hall wants
to make any changes she is at liberty to do so.54
In a suit for construction of the will, the Chancellor held that
the wife was given the possession, management, control and right
of disposition of the property during her life time, including "the
right to dispose of any and all of said property by will." The
Chancellor also held that if the first taker should die without a
will disposing of all or any part of the estate, the portion remaining at that time should go to Bert Hall under the will, but if he
should predecease Lena R. Hall, the remaining portion should
pass under the laws of descent and distribution to the heirs of
Lena R. Hall.
The wording of the trial court judgment in the Hall case is so
clear it can only be interpreted as having established absolute
ownership in the first taker subject to a valid gift over if the first
taker failed to dispose by will and if the donee over was then
alive. The Chancellor's description of the rights held by the first
taker and his interpretation that the property should go to her
heirs by descent if the gift over did not vest show unmistakably
that the wife owned the property in fee. It necessarily follows,
53 314 Ky. 783, 287 S.W. 2d 55 (1951).
54 Id. at 733, 237 S.W. 2d at 55.
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therefore, that the donee over had a valid remnant executory
interest contingent upon his survival of the first taker and also
contingent upon her failure to dispose by will. This was an
amazing decision by the trial court in view of the case law already
reviewed in this discussion, but on appeal the Court of Appeals
chose to dispose of the case in one short paragraph. Seemingly
with little realization of the implications involved, the Court said
only this:
We think the Chancellor properly disposed of the
case. Mr. Hall's intent is gathered readily from the one
sentence in which he disposed of his estate. The case comes
clearly within the scope of the opinion in the case of Berner
v. Luckett.55

Interestingly enough, Berner v. Luckett56 was decided three
years before the Hanks case, and it is most difficult to see how the
Court's opinion in this case would govern the Hall will, especially
in view of the interpretation given it by the Chancellor below.
The will in the Berner case was an elaborate instrument, one
clause of which purported to create a fee in the first taker, but
all other provisions of which suggested the present interest should
be a life estate only. The Hall will was a simple instrument
which the trial Chancellor interpreted as creating a fee in the
first taker. In Berner the appellate court sustained the gift over
on the ground that the whole will showed testator did not intend
to give his wife an absolute fee with unlimited power of disposition. In Hall the trial court judgment expressly identified the
wife's right as that of a fee owner with power to dispose by will.
The two cases are completely dissimilar except for the broad principle that testator's intent should be derived from reading the
whole will. The opinion in the Berner case emphasized this point
although the court was unwilling to apply it to a remnant gift
over as such until the Hanks case. It is impossible to tell whether
the Court was referring to this broad principle when it sustained
the Chancellor's finding in the Hall case merely by referring to
the scope of its opinion in the Berner case. If so, the Hall opinion,
cryptic though it is, could stand for the proposition that testator's
intent as expressed in the whole will must be given effect even
55 Id. at 734, 237 S.W. 2d at 56.
56 299 Ky. 744, 186 S.W. 2d 205 (1945).
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if the remnant gift over has to take effect as an executory interest.
One cannot escape the feeling, however, that the Hall case leaves
unanswered more than one basic question. Must the remnant gift
over take effect as a remainder as a matter of policy? Did the
Court in this case, for instance, mean that the Chancellor had
properly interpreted the will by construing it to create a life estate
coupled with an unlimited power of encroachment and disposition? Was the Hall will governed by the Berner opinion because
it created a remainder after a life estate even though the life
tenant had power of testamentary disposition? In sustaining the
Chancellor, was the Court trying to draw some distinction between a present fee simple and a life estate coupled with a general
power of appointment in so far as validity of the gift over is concerned?
The Berner opinion also distinguished carefully between a
remnant gift over after a fee and a gift over of the whole estate
after a fee. It classified the former as void because the biting
rule of construction had not yet been abandoned, but it classified the latter as valid because such a provision necessarily reduces the first taker's interest to a life estate. As will be seen subsequently, this distinction has been mentioned more recently, but
it would seem to be of little help in reconciling the Berner and
Hall cases because there is nothing in the Hall opinion to suggest
that the judgment below was sustained on the theory that the
present interest was necessarily a life estate. At best the two
cases are simply additional evidence of the fact that the Court
has neglected to fully rationalize its position on remnant gift provisions due in no small part to its purely constructional approach.
Letting the validity of each remnant gift over turn on an
interpretation of the particular will may be sound from the constructional viewpoint, but it requires the drawing of rather fine
distinctions as to the meaning of strikingly similar provisions.
Weakley v. Weakley17 is an excellent illustration of this technique.
The holographic will in this case read:
I leave all real estate and personal property to my
beloved son,.., to do with as he sees fit. Then goes to my
grandchildren at his death to share alike.5 8
S.W. 2d 524 (Ky. 1951).
58Id. at 525.
57 237
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In sustaining the gift over, the court said that the Hanks case
in no way disturbed the rule of construction where there is a gift
over of the whole estate because such gift has always created a
life estate in the first taker. The Berner case and Price v. Pricel0
were cited in support of this position, and the court made a point
of declaring that the only effect of the Hanks case was to
eliminate the conclusive presumption of voidness in the case of a
remnant gift over. The Price case had held, however, that a gift
over of the whole estate revealed an intention that the first taker,
as life tenant, should not have power to encroach on corpus.
Phrases and words that seemed to confer such power were construed to refer only to the life estate itself and not to the corpus.
Thus prior to the Hanks case and the Wealdey case, the
Court's formula was easy to apply. If there was a purported fee
followed by a gift over of the remnant, the gift over was void. If
there was a purported fee followed by a gift over of the whole
estate, the gift over was valid because a life estate without power
to encroach was created in the first taker. Either interpretation
was based on a reading of the whole will, but the decisive factor
was the extent of the gift over or what might be called the words
used to identify the subject matter of the future interest. The
first part of this formula was clearly repudiated in the Hanks case
and the second part was severely modified in the Weakley
opinion.
The express authorization in the Weakley will that the first
taker was to do with the property "as he sees fit" convinced the
Court that a power to encroach was intended. They reconsidered
this aspect of the Price opinion and repudiated it on the ground
that such phrases could only refer to power over the corpus since
all other rights of the present owner were fixed by the nature of
his life estate. For no apparent reason, however, the Weakley
opinion limited its rationalization to this particular point and
made no affirmative attempt to define the scope of the life
tenant's power. The trial Chancellor had decreed that the first
taker had full power to dispose by sale or encumbrance, or expenditure. He also decreed that the gift over should extend to
any property remaining undisposed of at the death of the first
59 298 Ky. 608, 188 S.W. 2d 652 (1944).
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taker. This judgment was affirmed without comment other than
that already described.
When taken together, the Hanks case and the Weakley case
seem to destroy the practical distinction between a remnant gift
and a gift of the entire estate. The former by its terms extends
only to the property not disposed of by the first taker and the
latter becomes possessory in the remnant only, because the life
tenant has power to encroach. Both cases sustain the gift over on
the theory that the first taker's interest is less than a fee although
the Hanks doctrine is not nearly so clear on this point as the
Weakley case and cases similar to it. Both cases leave undefined
the scope of the first taker's power to dispose and thus leave
unresolved the ultimate question: is the gift over valid only because the first taker's right can be explained as a life estate
coupled with a completely unlimited power to dispose?
The scope of the first taker's power to dispose was more precisely defined in Collings v. Collings Ex'rs., decided two, years
after the Weakley case."0 This opinion also contains an excellent
general summary of the court's view on remnant gifts over, taking into account the many and varied decisions it has rendered
through the years. Certain specific points that the Court chose
to clarify in this case should be mentioned. First, two controlling
principles have emerged from the cases: (1) The pivotal question in every case is whether the first taker receives a fee or a life
estate and one test is whether he was given the unlimited power
of disposition. (2) The intention of testator as gathered from the
whole will is to control. Second, the court abandoned long ago
the rigid and harsh common law rule that it is legally impossible
by subsequent clauses to qualify or limit the phrases in prior
clauses appropriate to create an apparent fee. Third, the Hanks
case means that a remnant gift over is no longer conclusively
presumed to be void and the Berner case means that the gift over
may serve to define the estate of the first taker as a life estate.
Fourth, whether the first taker has a life estate or a fee depends
on whether testator invested him with power to deed and to
devise in fee simple all of the property embraced in the will.
These then are the controlling principles, presumably for the
draftsman as well as the court. But what of the notion that the
60260 S.W. 2d 935 (Ky. 1953); noted 42 Ky. L.J. 717 (1954).
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instrument can create a fee in the first taker provided the gift
over takes effect as a remnant executory interest. This rationalization is conspicuously absent in the court's fully considered statement of legal doctrine. In most of the prior cases one could say
that the court was more concerned with construction than with
doctrine, but this is hardly a tenable evaluation of the Collings
case. Here the court fully evaluates its own precedent and finds
nothing in it to suggest that a remnant gift can take effect except
as a remainder after a life estate. The conclusion is inescapable
that this is an accurate and authoritative conclusion as to the
state of Kentucky law.
The failure of this rationalization to resolve adequately the
construction problem presented by remnant gift provisions is
beautifully illustrated in the Collings case itself, because when the
court came to apply its first and second principles in the face of
the plain meaning of the will, it was necessary to define the
scope of the first taker's power to dispose through implication.
The particular will in one clause gave all of the property to
testator's wife and in the next clause provided:
Any part of my estate remaining undisposed of at
the time of the death of my said wife, I will and bequeath
to my cousin, Lowell Anderson Colings. Should he not
survive her, then to his descendants (sic), if he leaves any,
and if not, to my heirs at law."'
The widow and executors contended the two clauses created
a fee simple absolute in her with no gift over. The donee over
maintained she took only a life estate with limited power to dispose and use for her benefit during her lifetime. The court was
quick to realize that its "power to will" test was not too helpful in
resolving this issue since the instrument was not express on this
point. Since this is the ultimate test, however, the implied intention of the testator with respect to the matter must be deermined. The court was equal to the task, however, and pointed
out that in this will:
It is unmistakably clear under the fourth clause
that the widow cannot dispose of the remainder of the
estate by will because the testator not only reserved this
right exclusively
to himself, but he has already fully exer62
cised it.
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Id. at 936.
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Id. at 937. (Emphasis supplied).
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This remarkable assertion shows beyond question that the
Court takes the gift over provision as the best evidence of
testator's intention not to confer power of testamentary disposal
on the first taker. A fortiori, the present interest is necessarily a
life estate and the future interest is necessarily a remainder. This
conclusion requires further implication as to the extent of the life
tenant's limited power to consume and dispose. On this point
also, the Court was equal to the task in the Collings case and concluded that testator's widow had "all right as to the use and enjoyment of the estate during her natural life; nevertheless, she
may not willfully waste it, nor give it away, nor dispose of it by
63
will."
The emphasized qualifications or limits placed on the first
taker's power were pure implication in the Collings case unless
they too result from the gift over provision, because the relevant
clause of the will describing the widow's rights was completely
silent on the matter. All the testator said there was: "All ... of
4
my estate I will, devise and bequeath to my beloved wife."
For some reason, the court did not explain or elaborate its reasons
for concluding that the first taker cannot willfully waste or give
the property away. Perhaps it was influenced by the absence of
words in the instrument affirmatively conferring a right to do with
the property "as he sees fit." In any event the court clearly
described the limited power that will be implied where there is
a gift over after a purported fee and nothing more.
This view has been expressly confirmed in St. Joseph Hospital
v. Dwertman,65 decided in 1954 and the last of the nine cases
under consideration. The will in this case was not as simple as
the typical instrument creating a true remnant gift over, since it
provided for a joint estate with right of survivorship in two first
takers and made the future interest over contingent on the death
of one of them without issue. This required the Court to de03
04

Ibid. (Emphasis supplied).
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268 S.W. 2d 646 (Ky. 1954).

Ibid. Appellees argued that this clause when read alone created a fee
because of K.R.S. 881.060, the statute abolishing words of inheritance. The Court
conceded that the statute did dispense with this requirement, but pointed out
that the statute did not change the rule that where there are words indicating
intent they will nevertheless govern. The Court seemed to take it for grantel
that this intent should be derived from the whole instrument and not from the
particular clause only. This also confirms the point made directly in the text that
the gift over provision is the best evidence that no fee was intended.
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termine whether the present interest was a fee, and if so whether
it was defeasible on death without issue before the testator's
death or whether the happening of this condition would divest
the fee whenever it occurred. As has been adequately described
elsewhere,66 the court rejected this "substitutional construction"
and upheld the gift over to certain charities. One clause in the
will provided, however, "I want my wife and daughter to enjoy
the full benefit of my estate during their lifetime." The Chancellor below construed this phrase to mean that the first takers
(as joint life tenants with survivorship) had the unlimited right
of disposition of the corpus except by will. The charitable donees
over appealed on the ground, inter alia, that the particular clause
could not be construed to authorize encroachment. The Court
took a middle view consistent with its position in the Collings
case, a position already decided but not announced since the
opinion in that case was not published until after the Chancellor's
finding in this case.
The court conceded that the earlier provisions of the will
devised and bequeathed the estate outright in fee simple to the
first takers, but said the later provisions did two things: (1)
reduced the fee to a life estate and (2) showed an intention for

the life tenants to have the full benefit of testator's estate and not
merely the full benefit of their life estate. The Court also said it
would seem appropriate to characterize such an interest as a
"consuming life estate," and further that "its true nature and the
limitations upon the right of disposition appear in" the Collings
opinion.67
Thus it seems quite clear that a remnant gift over in Kentucky

takes effect as a remainder after a "consuming life estate" if at
all and that the gift over provision itself shows a testamentary
intent for the life tenant's power of disposal to be so limited that
he cannot willfully waste it or give it away or dispose of it by
will.

66
Matthews, Kentucky Developments in 1954: Personal and Real Property,
Future Interests and Trusts, 44 Ky. LJ. 87, at 49 and 55 (1955).
67268 S.W. 2d at 648.
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CONCLUSION
The constructional nature of the remnant gift problem, the
traditional legal doctrine inhibiting its solution, and the recent
experience of the Kentucky Court in construing these wills all
suggest that a new look at the true nature of the remnant gift
over as a future interest is needed. A look needed in most jurisdictions ,one might add.
Enforcing such provisions as remnant executory interests conditioned on failure of the fee owner to dispose inter vivos or by
will clearly is the best solution from the constructional viewpoint, the doctrinal viewpoint and the drafting viewpoint. And
even more important, as described in greater detail in Part I of
this discussion,"" this interpretation permits full legal effect to be
given to the unequivocally expressed intent of the testator, even
the testator who writes his own will without knowing the elaborate apparatus provided by existing law for approximating his
wishes.
Although a tenuous argument can be made that the executory
interest solution is possible under the present view of the Kentucky Court, it surely would be better for the Court to review
its position and its previous decisions at the first appropriate opportunity and to decide directly whether a true remnant executory interest is invalid either as a matter of construction or as a
matter of policy.
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See discussion, supra, pp. 407 and 408.

